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THE ROLE OF WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATIONS IN SETTLING
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EUROPEAN UNION
Erin Walker
Department of Economics
Faculty Mentor: Gary D. Ferrier
Department of Economics

Abstract:
Description of Topic: In settling trade disputes, members
of the World Trade Organization use a dispute settlement
mechanism setfonh in the Uruguay Round oftrade negotiations.
This multilateral system of settling disputes is implemented if a
member believes other members are violating trade rules.
Disputes arise when countries adopt policies that break the WTO
agreements or that cause them to fail to fulfill obligations.
Dispute settlementprocedures have existed under many different
trade agreements. While current processes are more effective
than those of past agreements, they still lack credibility and
effectiveness.
Research and Results: The United States and the European
Union have used the WTO dispute settlement processes in
settling many trade disputes over the past decade. Currently, the
United States and European Union are involved in several
disputes, including the trade of meat treated with growth
honnones, the use of the U.S. Foreign Sales Corporation tax
exemption, and state subsidization of the steel industry. Recent
resolution ofthe long-standing dispute over the European Union
banana regime is a positive indicator of progress in trade
relations between the United States and the European Union.
These cases will be used to illustrate the point that current WTO
recommendations are not the most authoritative means ofsettling
international trade disputes and to suggest improvements, such
as increased use of negotiation and arbitration, to the dispute
settlement process. The mutually benefiting trade relationships
among independent nations can be greatly enhanced by
cooperation in and resolution of trade issues. Improvements to
the dispute settlement system would facilitate the edification of
the global economic environment.

Summary of Problem:
The World Trade Organization (WTO) offers to its members
a settlement mechanism for use in trade disputes. However, this
mechanism is not as effective or credible as it could be, as it
allows countries to delay in implementing WTO rulings. This is
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because the rulings do not specify what governments must do to
comply with thedecisions("Monkey Business"). The mechanism
looses efficiency because the process of settling trade disputes is
too lengthy.
The Uruguay Round of trade negotiations, which ended in
1994, set forth a multilateral system of settling disputes for
members of the WTO to use if they believe other members are
violating trade rules. Disputes arise when countries adopt policies
that break the WTO agreements or that cause them to fail to fulfill
obligations. This dispute resolution system is based on a laissezfaire attitude under which quarreling countries are encouraged to
settle disputes themselves through consultations and mediation.
The steps involved in settling disputes under the Uruguay
Round agreement have target time periods to be carried out. The
total amount of time spent on a case is set, but within that confine,
the timeline for each stage is flexible. The Dispute Settlement
Body oversees the case by establishing panels to consider the
case, monitoring enforcement of the rulings, and allowing
retaliation when rulings are not followed. The first stage of the
process is consultation. Countries involved in the dispute must
communicate in an effort to settle the problem themselves. If
they are not successful, or if they simply do not want to
communicate with one another, they may ask for mediation from
the WTO director general. In the second stage, which occurs if
consultation fails, the protesting nation may ask for a panel to be
appointed to assist the Dispute Settlement Body in making a
judgment on the case. This panel receives each side's case in
writing, and then, a preliminary hearing is held. At this hearing,
the disputing countries and any other country with a declared
interest in the controversy present their cases to the panel. Next,
the countries involved present written rebuttals and make oral
arguments at the second meeting of the panel. Throughout this
entire process, the panel may consult outside experts if necessary.
In the first draft of its report, the panel gives the factual and
argument sections to the parties, who have two weeks to comment.
The panel then submits an interim report including findings and
conclusions to the two sides, allowing one week for review. A
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final report is given to the disputing countries; three weeks later,
the report is sent to all WTO members. The panel may make
suggestions as to how to correct a trade policy that does not
comply with WTO rules. Within sixty Ms. Kapouliandays of the
final report being distributed, it becomes the Dispute Settlement
Body's ruling unless it is rejected by a consensus.
Either side can appeal the panel's ruling based on a point of
law but evidence cannot be reexamined or introduced. The
Dis~ute Settlement Body sets up a permanent seven-member
Appellate Body that represents a diverse range ofWTO member
countries. The Appellate Body may uphold, modify, or reverse
the panel's ruling. Following the ruling of the Appellate Body,
the Dispute Settlement Body has 30 days to accept or reject the
appeals report, with a consensus required for rejection.
Stage of Settlement Process:

Time Allotted:

Consultations

60days

Panel sets up and panelists'

45 days

appointments
Final report to the parties

6 months

Final panel reports to WTO

3 weeks

members
Dispute Settlement Body adopts

60 days

report (if no appeal)
Total

1 year (without
appeal)

Appellate Body report

60-90 days

Dispute Settlement Body adopts

30 days

Appellate Body Report
Total

1 year 3 months
(with appeal)

After the case has been decided, rapid acuon should be
taken by the losing country to bring its trade policies into step
with WTO rules. The "defendant" country must follow the
recommendations of the panel or appellate body. It must state its
intention to do so at the final meeting of the Dispute Settlement
Body, whereitcanalsomakeacaseforactingwithinareasonable
amount of time instead of immediately. However, if corrective
action is not taken within that time period, it has 20 days to
negotiate with the other country and come up with a plan for
compensation. If no agreement is reached within 20 days, the
complaining country can ask the Dispute Settlement Body for
permission to impose limited trade sanctions on the other country.
This dispute settlement mechanism is widely used by member
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nations of the WTO. It has often been used by the United States
and the European Union to settle trade disputes between the two.
Trade relations between the United States and the European
Union see few disputes, with only a little over 1% of transatlantic
trade volume under formal dispute (Burghardt). However, the
few problems that do exist between the groups have received an
overwhelming amount of media attention. This attention far
exceeds their economic importance (Wielard). The fact that the
economies of the United States and the European Union are so
closely tied contributes to the problems that exist. With such an
extended relationship and sometimes differing ideas about
economic circumstances, there are bound to be some
disagreements; two of these disagreements will be used to
illustrate the inefficiencies that exist in the WTO dispute resolution
procedures.
Recently, trade disputes between the United States and the
European Union have begun to move from traditional trade
barrier issues to problems stemming from regulation, licensing,
and standards relating to health, consumer, and environmental
protection. The European Union has a $5 million banana market
that was at the center of a major trade dispute for eight years. In
1993, the European Community adopted a Common Market
Organization for bananas. The trade policies established under
this system favored imports from former colonies ofEU member
nations. These policies restricted Latin American access to
European banana markets. This regime was found to be illegal
underWTO guidelines in 1997. In January 1999, a new import
scheme was implemented. This was also declared illegal according
to WTO standards because there was a quantity set aside
specifically for ACP countries. The United States became
involved in the case because two major American firms, Chiquita
and Dole, market bananas produced in Latin America and were
denied the opportunity to market their bananas to European
nations. In April1999, the United States was authorized by the
WTO to place trade sanctions on the European Union for an
annual value of$191 million (Bahree and Muffay). The United
States imposed I 00% duties on an equivalent amount of trade on
March 3, 1999 ("New Developments Complicate Banana
Dispute').
The disputing parties eventually agreed on a solution based
on a historical reference period. In 2006, trade policies for
bananas imported into the European Union will transition to a
tariff-only system. In the meantime, the European Union will
establish quotas and an import licensing system based on historical
trade shares that should increase prospects for Latin American
banana imports. Imports from former colonies of EU member
nations will still get preference.
Full implementation of this system depends on WTO
members granting the European Union waivers of the GATT
provisions that prohibit the preference of ACP countries' banana
imports. Beginning on July I, 200 I, the United States suspended
the trade sanctions on the European Union that had been previously
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authorized by the WTO. The European Union was charged with
the task of creating a proposal to the Council of Ministers that
would adjust the quantities of bananas in the various quotas,
increasing marketshare for Latin American producers and
protecting access to the market for the ACP countries. The
United States pledged to work to secure approval from the WTO
for the European plan.
Some contention is based on the commercial interests of
EU and U. S. business and government policies. The single
biggest trade sanctions claim is seen in an EU complaint dealing
with the U. S. Foreign Sales Corporation (FSQ -Winestock).
This tax policy is provided for under the Deficit Reduction Act
of 1984, which is the successor legislation to the Domestic
International Sales Corporation of 1971 (Smith). An FSC is a
separate foreign corporation that is incorporated in an approved
jurisdiction outside the United States, electing with its
shareholders' consent to be treated as an FSC. This export tax
benefit enables U.S. exporters to consider between 15% and 30%
of their export income as tax exempt and is estimated to save U.S.
companies approximately $4 billion annually (Eurecom). In an
FSC, for each qualifying sale made by a fum to foreign customer,
the firm pays a commission, determined by special transfer
pricing rules, to the FSC. The commission is a tax-deductible
expense to the firm. About one third of the commission income
is taxable income to the FSC. The net income of the FSC is
distributed back to the U.S. fum as a tax-exempt dividend
(Smith). The European Union lodged a complaint in 1998 that
the FSC provisions are an export subsidy and are a violation of
WTO regulations (Dreazen and Rogers). However, the United
States has questioned why the European Union waited 14 years
to complain about the regulations. The United States believes
that this challenge may be in response to U.S. challenges to EU
import regimes regarding bananas and beef (Dougherty). The
European Union has said that the challenge was intended to
improve equality in trade relations, but there is little evidence
that European companies were pushing for the change. Because
some European firms benefit from the FSC tax policy, they are
not fully encouraging of the EU claim ("The FSC Bomb"). The
WTO ruled that the U.S. tax exemption was in violation of trade
regulations. In November of 2000, Congress repealed the
exemption and passed a fix-it bill that rewrote the legal basis for
the program; the new law gives the same tax benefits as the
original FSC program. but it extends the provision to a certain
proportion of income from exporters' foreign operations. It also
eliminates the need for U.S. firms to set up an off-shore firm by
simply exempting income earned overseas from U.S. taxes
rather than having an exemption for exports only (Dreazen and
Rogers). The new law broadened the scope of the beneficiaries
for the FSC's, with the hope that the WTO could be convinced
that the policy was no longer dependent on exports. However, the
WTO still felt that the policy was too export related and was
contrary to the WTO agreement on subsidies (Smith). The new
laws "provide illegal export subsidies, violate the trade body's
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agricultural agreement, and discriminate in favor of U.S. goods
in breach of WTO rules" (Osborn and Denny). After the WTO
ruling against the new FSC policy, the European Union requested
the authority to impose $4 billion in retaliatory duties on U.S.
goods. The United States filed an appeal in August of2001 with
the WTO, which was considered unlikely to be successful.
However, the appeal allowed time for negotiations between the
disputing sides to avoid punitive sanctions being placed on the
United States (Alden). The European Union published an
indicative list of retaliatory sanctions with 46 general categories;
a detailed list with specific products would be compiled after the
final WTO ruling. If the United States does not do away with the
FSC tax policy, sanctions will be imposed in the form of 100%
penalty tariffs on imports of U.S. goods up to the value allowed
by the WTO (Winestock). The United States has said that if
sanctions are imposed, it will respond by bringing cases against
the European Union to the WTO ("The FSC Bomb"). The
resulting escalation of the situation would be harmful to the trade
relationship between the two sides. On January 14, 2002, the
WTO threw out the U.S. appeal. At this point, both sides have 60
days to present arguments to a WTO arbitrator who will rule on
any permitted retaliatory tariffs by the end of March (Mortished).
The resolution ofboth of these cases, the FSC tax exemption
case in particular, hopefully will set a precedent for cooperation
between disputing parties in settling trade conflicts. While
neither dispute was settled through multilateral negotiations, and
there was evidence of noncompliance with WTO rulings in both
cases, both sides were willing to work together after the final
rulings to avoid escalation of the situation into a full-blown trade
war.

Conclusion Reached:
Through the illustrations provided by past trade disputes
that have been resolved under the WTO's dispute settlement
mechanism, it is evident that some modifications must be
implemented in the process. One option is to make the existing
settlement process streamlined and efficient. A system involving
permanent panelists and a speeding up of the process wherever
possible will make the overall process more efficient. A permanent
panel would create a team of experts who are familiar with the
dispute settlement process and are readily available to review
trade disputes. Because the panel would have experience in
dealing with the procedures specified by the WTO, it would be
able to move through those procedures quickly and arrive at
rulings in an efficient manner. Clarification of the policies on the
sequencing. arbitration procedure on the level of suspension of
concessions, and the establishment of policies to lift suspension
of concessions would also improve the overall processes. All
parties involved in the dispute and its resolution would be aware
of the actions involved in resolving a trade dispute. Another
option is to place importance on negotiation with less emphasis
on the procedural aspects of the settlement mechanism. Member
nations, as well as the WTO itself, have expressed the view that
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consultation is a more effective resolution tool than litigation.
However, only 32 outof203 cases had been settled outside of the
WTO panel process for settling disputes by July 2000. Nations
should clearly define their advocacy of negotiation in this
process for it to attain prominence in the settlement proceedings.
Negotiations could be conducted under the auspices of the WTO
or independent of any official guidance from an outside
authoritative body. Nations have differing opinions on which of
these situations is more favorable to the settlement of disputes.
The United States has proposed early, bilateral consultations
before the disputing nations go to the WTO. It advocates the use
of neutral, third party mediators or panels. The European Union
has stated that mediation should occur within the parameters of
the WTO because it believes that outside consultations have no
enforcement capacity.

Value of Project:
Trade is a fundamental part of today's global economy.
Healthy trade relationships allow countries to specialize in
producing items best suited to their resources while acquiring
other products that they do not produce from nations that
specialize in those products. Trade also broadens the market that
countries are able to target, resulting in greater and more
comprehensive commerce. Aside form these theoretical benefits
of trade, it is also advantageous for countries to form trade
relationships because they can increase the income of those
nations. For example, the Uruguay Round is estimated to increase
the income of the United States by $42 billion each year, and
NAFTA has produced gains of between $10 billion and $50
billion with tariff cuts of $14.2 billion (Office of the United
States Trade Representative). The need for an efficient and
effectivemeansofsettlingtradeconflictsisintegraltomaintaining
healthy trade relationships and the economic advancements
created through those relationships.
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Faculty Comments:
Ms. Walker's faculty mentor, Gary D. Ferrier, had high
praise for her work. He said:
Economists have long recognized that trade is
beneficial as it allows trading parties to specialize in
their areas of comparative advantage, thus increasing
total production of goods and services as well as
consumption. In the latter part of the 20th century,
numerous international agreements were entered into
to facilitate trade. However while society as a whole
gains from open trade, some individuals or groups
may lose in the short run and thus have incentives to
limit trade. International trade agreements typically
provide means to dispute restrictions on trade. In
spite of this, trade dispute resolution is often a long,
drawn-out affair that ends ambiguously.
Ms. Walker's thesis examines the trade dispute
resolution mechanism that existed under the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade as well as those that
exist under the GAIT's successor, the World Trade
Organization. Her conclusion is that the mechanisms
are ineffective.
Ms. Walker's honors research carefully walks readers
through the tedious dispute resolution mechanisms
oftheGATI and WTOanddiscusses the shortcomings
of the mechanisms. Ms. Walker then illustrates the
ineffectiveness of the GATI and WTO dispute
settlement mechanisms with examples of disputes
b~tween the United States and the European Union.
Fmally, Ms. Walker offers recommendations on how
to improve both the timeliness and credibility of
dispute resolution.

Overall, Ms. Walker's research offers a clear and
concise overview and critique of the status quo with
regard to the resolution of trade disputes and offers
some compelling means for improving the process.
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Professor of Accounting Deborah W. Thomas sees Ms.
Walker's work as affecting taxation. She says:

Hoyt Purvis, Professor of International Relations. is also
interested in Ms. Walker's work. He remarks:

I first met Erin Walker when I served as a faculty
sponsor for the first group of Bodenhamer Fellows on
their trip to Washington, D.C. Ms. Walker's
performance during the past four years has proved
that her selection as a Bodenhamer Fellow was well
deserved. She has tackled intellectual challenges by
pursuing two majors in different colleges while
maintaining high academic standards. Ms. Walker
was a student in my Fundamentals of Taxation class
Iastyear,inwhichlwasabletoobserveherworkethic
and academic ability first hand. She has been a student
leader, both within the Walton College as a Student
Ambassador and for the University in student
government. Ms. Walkerhasbeenavaluablemember
of the University of Arkansas community.

I am pleased to be working with Erin Walker on lwr
undergraduate honors research project on trade
disputes between the United Stall'S
Europt·.m
and thL·
and the role of the World Trade Organization.

Ms. Walker's choice of thesis topic reflects her interest
in both business and international relations. She is
investigating the effectiveness of the World Trade
Organization in dealing with international trade
disputes. Ms. Walker focuses on recent cases,
particularly the case between the United States and
the European Union over banana trade, to evaluate
the WTO procedures for resolving disagreements.
This is an important topic as the global economy
expands and more friction develops among the
domestic interests of participating countries. In the
area of taxation, this has been seen most recently with
a WTO ruling requiring that the United States revise
its international tax system.
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Union

Ms. Walker has chosen a topic that in some re~ptx·ts
brings together her unique combination of ,l(,ldemk
interests: accounting and intl•mational relations, with
an additional concentration in European Stud it.'!>.
She has identified and tackled a difficult but important
topic and has gone about it in ht.•r usual thoughtful,
serious, and persistent mannt•r.l have bt't.'n impTl'~~·d
by the way in which she has immerM.'1.i ht.•rsdf in tht.~
complexity of regulatory isslll.'S involving tht.• World
Trade Organization and various isSUl'S in disputt•
between the United States and the European Union.
She has bet>n able to develop a good understanding of
how these issues develop and what means there are
for dealing with them as well as some of the
implications for the futureofU .5.-European t'Conomic
relations.
Erin Walker has excelled as a student and has been
willing to take on challenging subjects, as is evident
from this research project. I am confident that the final
product of Ms. Walker's work will represent a
significant contribution to understanding what is
involved in these trade disputes, the role of the WTO,
and what all this could mean for the future of trade
and economic relations between the United States
and the European Union.
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